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Abstract 
 
This dissertation studies the effect of mayors aligned with a centre left presidential coalition on 
policy outcomes and corruption. I use Regression Discontinuity Design in Brazilian municipal 
elections for two mayoral terms, from 2001 to 2008. Theories about politician´s behaviour, 
include ideological and self-interested motivations, although previous studies analyse it 
separately. Results indicate that municipalities aligned with the president’s coalition receives 
more transfers but are not more corrupt and allocate resources differently.     Therefore, even in 
the context of    institutional fragility and corruption, politician’s preferences about policies can 
be relevant in the provision of public services.  
1. Introduction 
How relevant politician's ideology or preferences is to determine policies at government is still 
an open debate. Models that study the relationship between politicians motivations and 
government, often assume that politicians only care about winning the office to extract rents, 
whether monetary or self-esteem (Besley, 2006). These different incentives, both the ideological 
and self-interested, have been broadly analysed, but, can all of them be present in the same party 
system at the same time? Through which channels can interact it? The motivations and 
incentives of politicians are at the core of the political economy, and these are important 
questions because it helps to understand the welfare consequences of government intervention.    
This dissertation addresses these question, analysing the effect of being aligned with a centre 
left president´s coalition on policy outcomes in Brazilian municipalities. Brazil offers an ideal 
framework to do this. It is one of the most unequal countries in the world and since 2003 
experienced an unprecedented reduction in income inequality
1
 together with the first-time 
victory of a centre left president (Lula da Silva - Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Along with 
this, during the last decade, a great amount of corruption scandals have come to light, both at 
the local and at the national level. Therefore, it has been pointed out that politicians have other 
motivations than ideology (Brollo et al., 2013; Ferraz & Finan, 2011).  
At the national level, the main challenge to identify the causal effect of political parties on 
economic outcomes is the construction of the counterfactual. Indeed, reduction in inequality was 
common in other countries in Latin America. At the local level, arise the problem that political 
parties are not randomly allocated to municipalities. If voter´s preferences determine the change 
in the social policies in Brazil, the correlation between a centre left coalition at government and 
the pro-reduction in inequality policies would be spurious.  
To solve this problem, I address the question of the importance of ideology of political parties in 
policy outcomes in Brazilian municipalities using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in 
context of close elections, where the mayoral candidate of the centre left coalition barely loses 
                                                          
1
 Gini coefficient decreased from 0.58 to 0.51 between 2002 and 2014 (‘SEDLAC - STATS’, 2017) 
 or win the municipal election. Brazilian institutional framework is one of the most decentralised 
in the world, where municipalities play a fundamental role in the provision of critical public 
services. Besides, data from Brollo et al. (2013) includes objectives measures of corruption at 
the local level in Brazil.  
Findings of this dissertation, in line with Brollo & Nannicini (2012) results for a long a period, 
show that mayors aligned with president´s coalition receive more discretionary federal transfers 
in the last two years of government during 2001 and 2005 mayoral terms. These same 
municipalities aligned with the president´s coalition, despite having more resources available 
are not more corrupt. Instead of that, I find evidence that mayor´s aligned with the president´s 
coalition spend more in education, one of the main responsibilities in the provision of public 
goods in Brazilian local governments.   
Therefore, as Brollo & Nannicini (2012) pointed out in their theoretical model, the president can 
support aligned mayors motivated on the potential rents that this mayor can extract for him. 
However, I present evidence that suggests that president support to aligned mayors can also be 
driven by the implementation of specific policies in municipalities.  
This dissertation is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and discuss the 
theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the institutional framework and the data. Section 4 
illustrates the econometric framework. Section 5 presents the results. I conclude with Section 6.  
 
  
 2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
2.1. Literature review 
This paper contributes to the literature that analyses the relationship between political outcomes 
and electoral results using RDD. Seminal work of Lee, Moretti, & Butler, 2004 compare 
policies between Democrats and Republicans House representatives and do not find a 
convergence effect on voting records.  
Although there is vast literature that finds partisan effects at the state level (Besley and Case, 
2003), evidence at the local level it is mixed. Looking for partisan effects at the local level, as 
this work does, Ferreira & Gyourk (2009) analyse differences on public spending between 
Democrats and Republicans among US mayors. Ferreira & Gyourk (2009) results are based on 
2,000 mayoral elections, between 1950 and 2000, in 400 US cities. They do not find any 
difference between Democrats and Republicans mayors on local public finance outcomes such 
as total revenues and taxes, the share of intergovernmental transfers, public employment, total 
expenditure and crime rates. Besides, they discuss three different channels that can lead their 
results such as more homogeneity at the local level, more constraints and fewer possibilities of 
sending a targeted message to citizens. Finally, the explanation that has more empirical support 
is that constraints, such as competition with nearby municipalities, limit the development of 
different public policies.    
On the contrary, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) analyse differences between socialist and no 
socialist parties in 228 Swedish municipalities over 21 periods. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) find 
that left-wing Swedish parties spend and tax more than right-wing governments. Also in US 
mayor elections, Gerber & Hopkins (2011) find differences between Democrat and Republicans 
in areas in which local governments face fewer constraints from higher levels of government. 
Their results indicate that mayors spend less in public safety, but they do not find differences in 
other areas such as tax and social policies. This paper contributes to this literature in several 
ways. First, there is no evidence of the effect of political parties' ideology on policies in less 
developed countries, and in a context of high inequality and high incidence of corruption. 
 Besides, unlike US institutional framework, Brazilian municipalities have major political power 
and play an essential role in the provision of relevant social policies such as education and 
health. Finally, this dissertation analyses the effect of a president´s coalition around a 
differentiated left-wing party, while Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) build two ideological blocs in a 
multi-party system.   
This paper also contributes to the literature that analyse models of rents extraction by 
politicians.  Brollo & Nannicini (2012) analyse the effect of mayor alignment on federal 
transfers in Brazil between 1996 and 2008. They find that mayors aligned with president´s party 
or president’s coalition receive more transfers in the last two years of mandate.  
Several papers analyse the relationship effects and determinants of corruption, using data from 
disclosed audit reports of Brazilian municipalities. Ferraz & Finan (2008) compare the effect on 
electoral outcomes of equally corrupted mayors with different timing of the information 
disclosed, before and after the election.  They find that accounting for the level of corruption, 
expose corrupt politicians reduce the probability of re-election. Using the same database, Ferraz 
& Finan (2011) compare the corruption behaviour of politicians that are in their first and second 
term, in a framework that allows for one re-election. Ferraz & Finan (2011) find that mayors 
that cannot be re-elected misappropriate 27 percent more resources than mayors that are in their 
first term. They also find that this effect varies according to local institutions and the presence 
of media. 
Brollo et al. (2013), using a fuzzy RDD to analyse the effect of extra federal transfers., that are 
distributed to municipalities according to population thresholds, on the politician behaviour. 
They find that local governments that receive larger resources are involved in corruption acts 
with higher probability and increase the share of resources misappropriated in that corruption 
acts. -Besides, these extra resources reduce the quality of the pool candidates, because the value 
of political rents is higher in candidates with lower ability. As a result, although mayors that 
received extra funds are more corrupt, they are not electorally punished. This work contributes 
 to the literature that analyses political behaviour introducing the ideology of a coalition of 
parties as a relevant determinant of corruption and allocation of discretionary transfers.  
2.2. Theoretical framework 
The determinants of public policies are a central question in modern political economics. 
Following Persson & Tabellini (2002), politician behaviour can be modelled in three ways. 
First, candidates can only be motivated by winning the election, only with the objective of 
holding the office (Electoral Competition). They can also have the ability of extract rent through 
corruption (Agency models). In both cases the median voter it is pivotal. Build in these 
theoretical models, Brollo & Nannicini (2012) emphasise that the main channel that drives the 
distribution of federal resources in favour of local political allies are the future benefits (in 
electoral or rent terms) that those allies can generate to the presidents. Moreover, Brollo et al. 
(2013) find that extra resources to municipalities can exacerbate political agency behaviours, 
and increase corruption.  
Finally, politicians can be guided by the ideology of the party (Partisan politicians), and they 
desire to implement policies according to their ideas and principles. In this context, ideology 
can be an important determinant of the public policy outcome.  
  
 3. Background and data 
3.1. Institutional background  
Brazil is a federal republic with a presidential system. It has 27 states and over 5500 
municipalities. It runs elections every two years. In 1998, 2002 and 2006 ran federal elections 
and in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. During federal elections, president, state governor 
and legislature are elected. In municipal elections, mayors (Prefeitos) and municipal legislature 
(Camara dos Vereadores) are directly elected. Majority rule decides in elections that exceed 
200,000 eligible voters, that means that if any of the candidates do not reach 50% percent of the 
nominal votes, a second round takes places one month later with the two candidates who receive 
the highest number of votes in the first round. Otherwise, candidates are elected through 
plurality rule, where the most voted candidate in the first round is elected. Since 1996 electoral 
reform, mayors and presidents can be re-elected for one additional term.  
Brazilian is a multiparty system, in which all the parties are far from getting the absolute 
majority in the national congress. In 2000 and 2004 municipal elections, 30 and 27 parties took 
part. During the period of analysis, the most important parties were PMDB (Partido do 
Movimiento Democrático Brazileiro), PFL (Partido da Frente Liberal) PT (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores), PSDB (Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira). 2002 and 2006 federal 
elections left these four parties separated by 4 per cent of the seats, between 18 and 14 17 and 
13 per cent, respectively. PT is ideologically different from the other three parties, and it is in 
the left spectrum (Lucas & Samuels, 2010). Differences between the other three parties are less 
clear (Lucas & Samuels, 2010), located in the centre (PMDB and PSDB) are centre right (PFL). 
In 2002, PT won the Brazilian general election for the first time, and Lula da Silva was elected 
president, replacing Fernando Henrique Cardozo (PSDB), who ruled the country since 1995. 
Lula da Silva was re-elected in 2006, and he could build centre left stable coalitions during his 
two mandates. The number of municipalities won by PT also increase in this period, from 187 
in 2000 elections to 411 in 2004. PMDB won the largest part of the parliamentary seats and 
 municipalities, and was an important part of federal government coalitions, being part of the 
two presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardozo and of the second presidency of Lula da Silva. 
3.2. Brazilian municipalities 
Brazil is one of the countries that more decentralised the provision of public services in local 
municipalities, which indeed have high political power. Local governments play a fundamental 
role in the provision of education, health, transportation and local infrastructure, where the first 
two account for half of the budget. Municipalities revenues rely mainly on state and federal 
transfers and local revenues (such as taxes and fines) only represent 6% on average of the total 
revenues. Federal transfers represent 65% of the total revenues and are divided into 
constitutional transfers (determined by municipal population) and discretionary transfers (Brollo 
& Nannicini, 2012). Some constitutional statements relate to part of the transfers to specific 
spending in health or education, but mayors still have power decision to allocate spending 
(Ferraz & Finan, 2011).  
3.3. Data and variables of interest  
Elections 
Data on electoral results is provided by the Brazil´s electoral authority (Tribunal Superior 
Electoral), and it is available on its website. The unit of analysis is the municipality. The period 
of analysis covers the 2000 and 2004 elections, that coincided with a PT president. From this 
source, I will build the treatment of the RDD, that states if the mayor is aligned with president 
coalition. As it is shown in figure 1, because of the gap between presidential and mayor terms, 
treatment is defined if the mayor´s party is part of the president´s coalition during the last two 
years of the mayor´s term. Table A1 describes parties included in government coalitions year by 
year. Data on mayor characteristics (age, gender and education) are also available in the Brazil´s 
electoral authority website. 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Brazilian elections over the sample period 
 
Policies 
The Brazil´s federal National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional) database Finbra provides 
information about municipality's finances for all the sample period except 2003. This data 
provides the total expenditure and total revenues per municipality and year. I build an indicator 
of fiscal deficit, as total revenues minus total expenditure. I also consider the distinction 
between current and capital revenues. Besides, there is information available on 28 budget 
categories and several revenues divisions. From these categories, I analyse the expenditure in 
Education and Health. These are part of the core functions of local governments in Brazil. All 
transfers and expenditures are measured per capita and in 2000 Brazilian reais.  
Following Brollo & Nannicini (2012) identification strategy of the effect of political alignment 
on federal transfers, I consider the federal transfers coded as transferencias de capital, which 
destiny is infrastructure projects and are mainly discretionary. The role of the president 
allocation the amount of transfers in municipalities is major, he has the last word and influences 
the process in many phases of the discussion process. Also according to Brollo & Nannicini 
(2012), the effect on political alignment is expected in the last two years of the mandate, 
because of electoral concerns. 
 
  
Corruption 
Data on corruption is available from Brollo et al. (2013). In 2003, the federal government start 
an anti-corruption programme, based on audits on municipalities randomly selected in open to 
the public lotteries. Information about corruption practices found in audits is available on the 
website of the independent organism that carried these out. Brollo et al. (2013) develop four 
indicators of corruption, based on two definitions: broad corruption and narrow corruption. For 
each definition, they define a binary variable (equal to one if at least an irregularity was found) 
and the fraction of resources involved in corruption acts. Broad corruption definition includes 
acts that could not only be interpreted as obvious corruption but also as bad administration. 
The categories of irregularities included in broad corruption are (i) “illegal procurement 
practices”, (ii) “fraud”, (iii) “favouritism in the good receipt”, (iv) “over-invoicing”, (v) 
“diversion of funds” and (vi) “paid but not proven”. Includes the (i) “severe illegal procurement 
practices” (ii) “fraud”, (iii) “favouritism in the good receipt” and (iv) “over-invoicing”. 
Public employees 
As an additional outcome of local policies, I analyse the effect of alignment with president´s 
coalition on public employees. Data of public employees at the municipal level is available on 
the survey Brazilian Municipalities Profile (Perfil dos Municipios Brasileiros) conducted by 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 
IBGE). Besides data on total public employees, I can separate temporary employees, an 
indicator of patronage (Brollo & Troiano, 2016). Data on public employees is only available for 
the term 2005-2008. 
Local characteristics 
Variables used to describe municipalities are from two sources. On the one hand, Population 
and 2000 census Gini coefficient are available in Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
 (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE). On the other hand, urban population and 
mean years of education are available from the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economics 
Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada). 
  
 4. Econometric strategy  
4.1. Empirical question and econometric challenges 
How important is political party’s ideology to determine policies at the local level in Brazil? 
The relation of interest, between political party 𝑃𝑚,𝑡  (aligned with centre-left president´s 
coalition) at government in municipality 𝑚  at time 𝑡  can be represented by the following 
equation:  
𝑌𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑃𝑚,𝑡𝛽1 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑚,𝑡  represents the outcome of interest (different fiscal policies or corruption) in 
municipality 𝑚 at time 𝑡 and 𝑃𝑚,𝑡 is a dummy variable that it is equal to 1 if a mayor of party P 
won the election in municipality m immediately before of time 𝑡. Additionally, one could also 
add a series of covariates such as characteristics of the locality or characteristics of the 
candidate such as education level.  
The main identification problem to estimate the equation (1) it is that whether political party P 
win or lose in a municipality is determined by voter´s preferences, not observable by the 
econometrician, that could also influence the political party´s platforms and policy outcomes. 
This identification problem generates an endogeneity problem because of omitted variables. As 
we probably do not have a random selection of party P´s mayors among municipalities, one 
could observe that political parties allocate public expenditures in different ways because 
voter´s preferences are different.  Also, we can think that reverse causality may be important as 
well. Policies can affect voter´s preferences and voting behaviour, leading to votes for party P. 
This problem is crucial because as it is derived from the Electoral competition and Agency 
models described above, policies directly depend on voter preferences. Politicians care only 
about winning elections (no about the policies she will develop), so political platforms and 
policies are determined by voter preferences. What we would like to assess it is whether mayors 
of party P perform different policies, beyond voter preferences and motivated by party 
preferences.  
 4.2. Identifying the impact of a centre left president´s coalition on policies 
The ideal experiment would be to randomly allocate centre-left mayors aligned with president´s 
coalition and right-wing mayors in two samples representative of Brazil´s municipalities. If 
these two samples are statistically identical, including voting preferences, the difference 
between the outcomes of party P and right-wing mayor localities would be causal. Despite this 
ideal experiment is not feasible, comparing mayor elections in localities where party P barely 
win with localities where barely loose, regression discontinuity design (RDD) can identify 
causal impacts as in randomised experiments. This property of RDD was demonstrated by (Lee, 
2008).  
The main identification assumption of the RDD is that in scenarios of close elections, in the 
absence of the victory of a party P mayor policy, outcomes in both municipalities would be 
equal. Therefore, the municipality where mayor aligned barely lose the election is the 
counterfactual of the municipality where it barely won. 
RDD exploits the fact that treatment status (victory of the mayor of party P) is a deterministic 
and discontinuous function of a covariate, 𝑥𝑖  (vote share margin of victory, that is equal to the 
vote share of P candidate minus the vote share of the second candidate). That case, namely 
Sharp RDD, the probability that a P mayor won an election jump from 0 to 1 if she gets more 
votes than the other candidates, that is, if 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 (the margin of victory is positive).   
The other key identification assumption of the RDD is that the relationship between the 
variables that the econometrician cannot observe (e.g. voter´s preferences) are continuous 
around threshold in the margin of victory. So, any discontinuity in the variable of interest 
(policies) it is not attributable to the unobserved variable and corresponds to an effect of 
treatment (P mayor). Discontinuity of covariates is a problem for the econometrician in cases 
where politicians can manipulate their share of votes to win the election and get 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 . 
Consider the percentage of votes as a sum of two components 𝑋 = 𝑍 +  𝜀, where 𝑍 represents 
the systematic, predictable component of 𝑋  that can depend on the characteristics of the 
 candidate or the quality of the campaign and 𝜀 is a random component (e.g. the weather the day 
of the election) with a continuous density. The existence of the random component 𝜀 determined 
the victory of aligned mayors with a very narrow margin of votes "as if by a flip of a coin" (Lee, 
2008), and assign the treatment status as random. Otherwise, imagine a situation where a mayor 
could predict the exact share of votes and interfere in the voting process to increase its votes if 
she is not the “true” winner. Then, if this occurs in several elections, we would observe a 
discontinuity of 𝑋 around 0. Consequently, municipalities, where an election was manipulated, 
were selected and the random component of selection eliminated.  
If the assumptions mentioned above holds, RDD identifies the average treatment effects 
comparing municipalities where party P barely win (𝑥𝑖 just above 0) and barely lose (𝑥𝑖 just 
below 0). Using potential outcome notation, and the subscript m to identify a municipality, this 
can be stated in the following way: 
lim𝑥𝑖→0+ 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑋 = 𝑥𝑖] − lim𝑥𝑖→0− 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑋 = 𝑥𝑖] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1) − 𝑌(0)|𝑋 = 𝑥𝑖] (2) 
There is no evidence of the kind of fraudulent behaviour in Brazil´s election. However, the 
advantage of this assumption is that a validity check can be empirically performed. As RDD can 
be analysed as random experiments around the threshold, all the variables that are determined 
before the treatment assignment should have the same distribution above and below the 
threshold (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). If political parties can manipulate their margin of victory, 
one would observe a discontinuity of the covariates around the threshold. 
The equation (1) presented above can now be transformed in a local linear regression, in races 
where the margin of victory fall in interval [−ℎ, +ℎ], as it is shown in the next equation: 
𝑌𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝑥𝑚,𝑡𝜋1+𝑃𝑚,𝑡𝜋2 + 𝜇𝑚,𝑡 (3) 
Where 𝑥𝑚,𝑡  is the vote share margin of victory a candidate election at time 𝑡  and in 
municipality  𝑚  , 𝑌𝑚,𝑡  represents the outcome of interest (policies and corruption) in 
municipality 𝑚 at time 𝑡 and 𝑃𝑚,𝑡 is a dummy variable that it is equal to 1 if a mayor aligned 
 with the president´s coalition won the election in municipality m immediately before of time 𝑡. 
In equation (3)  𝜋2  is the casual effect of interest. RDD identify the causal effect by 
distinguishing the nonlinearity of 𝑌, when 𝑥 ≥ 0, in a smooth and linear function of 𝑥 . An 
optimal bandwidth is calculated according to Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014) algorithm. 
As an additional check, I also show the results in intervals close to zero, with the margin of 
victory equal to 10 and 5 percent. 
But the linearity assumption of the relation between the margin of votes and the outcome of 
interest above and below the threshold do not always hold. It is expected that, in a narrow 
neighbourhood of the threshold x (e.g. 5% of margin of victory), the sample average is a biased 
estimation of the true expectation of Y at the threshold. Then, it is preferred to estimate a 
version of equation (2), allowing non-linearities, such as a polynomial functional form: 
𝑌𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝑚,𝑡𝛿1+𝑃𝑇𝑚,𝑡𝜋1 + 𝑥𝑚,𝑡𝛿2
2 + ⋯ + 𝑥𝑚,𝑡𝛿𝑝
𝑝+𝑃𝑇𝑚,𝑡𝜋2
2+ ⋯ + 𝑃𝑇𝑚,𝑡𝜋𝑝
𝑝 + 𝜇𝑚,𝑡  (4) 
Therefore, 𝜋2 represents the pure effect of the president´s coalition on policies. This effect is 
estimated controlling for a pth-order polynomial in the margin of victory and for a pth order 
polynomial of the interaction between the margin of victory and the assignments variable. 
  
 5. Results 
5.1. Sample selection  
Data on municipal elections is available for 5555 and 5562 elections in 2000 and 2004, 
respectively. To implement my empirical strategy, I follow Brollo & Nannicini (2012) sample 
restriction, who also implement a RDD in the Brazilian multiparty system. I restrict the sample 
to elections where there are two candidates, one aligned with president´s coalition and the other 
not. This strategy is better than consider all the elections where one aligned and other no aligned 
candidate finished in the first two places, no matter the number of candidates. In this case, the 
treatment selection depends on the result of the election. Therefore, with the restriction I made 
in the sample, treatment depends only on pre-electoral variables. Analogously, I consider 
elections in municipalities with population under 200,000, where mayors are elected by 
plurality rule. This sample of 2,673, is restricted to 2,449 observations that have data on the 
main policies analysed. For the effect of political alignment on corruption, the database of 2,134 
audit reports match with 474 elections of our restricted sample of 2,673 elections. Data on 
public employees is available for 1,481 elections, because is only available for 2005-2008 
mayor term. Table 1 summarize the samples for each outcome considered in total and for each 
term.  
Table 1. Sample selection 
  Term 
Total 
  2001-2004 2005-2008 
Elections 5,555 5,562 11,117 
Sample restricted 1,189 1,484 2,673 
Sample restricted - policies 1,074 1,375 2,449 
Sample restricted - corruption 270 204 474 
Sample restricted - public employees   1,481 1,481 
Notes. Sample is restricted to elections where there are two candidates, one aligned with president´s coalition and the other not in 
municipalities with less than 200,000 registered voters. Sample restricted for the different outcomes (policies, corruption and public 
employees) describes the number of municipalities with no missing values in each outcome. 
 
  
 5.2. Summary statistics 
Table 2 summarize municipal and mayor characteristics in our sample of 2,449 and mean 
differences between the 1,111 municipalities aligned with the president´s coalition and the 
1,338 nonaligned. RDD allows for selection in observable characteristics if none of those 
characteristics present discontinuities at the threshold. However, it is worthwhile to mention that 
the only difference that is significant is the proportion of mayors that are in their first term. That 
is because the number of mayors elected aligned with the president has grown during the period 
of analysis. This could be of special worried in the analyses of the effect of political alignment 
on corruption, because Ferraz & Finan (2008) show that facing re-election incentives decrease 
the incidence of corruption. Therefore, as a robustness check, I perform corruption analysis only 
for those mayors that are in their first term, and results remain unchanged.  
Table 3 summarize corruption variables for the 474 audit reports from Brollo et al. (2013) 
database. The incidence of at least one episode of broad corruption, is 77 percent and 5 per cent 
of the resources audited (when this information is available. The probability of founding at least 
one episode of narrow corruption is 44 per cent, these episodes involve on average 2 per cent of 
the resources audited. These 474 audit reports correspond to 223 mayors aligned with the 
president´s coalition and 251 no aligned.  
  
 Table 2. Summary statistics of mayors and municipalities 
  President´s coaliton 
  Alligned Unalligned Difference 
Mayoral characteristics    
Male 0,94 0,93 0.00785 
   
(0.010) 
High school complete 0,72 0,72 (0.018) 
   
0.00216 
Age 47,42 47,08 0.33809 
   
(0.984) 
First term 0,73 0,59 0.14598 
   
(0.019)*** 
Local characteristics    
Population 11774,01 11593,96 180.05354 
   
(605.482) 
Adult years of schooling 3,84 3,84 -0.00098 
   
(0.048) 
% urban population 53,92 52,83 1.09913 
   
(0.899) 
GDP per capita (2000) 3992,61 3964,04 28.56842 
   
(174.778) 
Gini coefficient 0,55 0,55 -0.00151 
   
(0.003) 
North 0,05 0,06 -0.00998 
   
(0.009) 
Northeast 0,32 0,32 0.00310 
   
(0.019) 
Southeast 0,29 0,27 0.02721 
   
(0.018) 
South 0,26 0,28 -0.01895 
   
(0.018) 
Center 0,08 0,08 -0.00137 
      (0.011) 
Notes: This table compares the mean of mayor and municipal characteristics between aligned and no aligned mayors. These 
statistics were computed over the 2,449 observations that have no missing values on the policies analysed. The first column 
computes the mean for the 1,111 municipalities where the mayor is aligned with the president´s coalition. The second column 
computes the mean for the 1,338 municipalities where the mayor is not aligned with the president´s coalition. The third column 
reports the differences in means, and robust standard errors in brackets. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 
percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 3. Summary statistics of corruption 
  Corruption 
(binary 
variable) 
Fraction of 
funds  
 Panel A: Broad corruption 
  Observations 474 441 
Mean 0,77 0,05 
Panel B: Narrow corruption 
  Observations 474 441 
Mean 0,44 0,02 
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of the sample restricted of 2,449 municipalities that have information in corruption 
for the variables, from the Brollo et al. (2013).  
 
 
  
5.3. The impact of alignment with PT president´s coalition on policies 
 
In this section, I present the results for effect of mayors aligned with the PT president´s coalition 
on different policy outcomes. Results are reported for OLS estimation (equation 1), local linear 
regression with optimal bandwidth calculated with Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik (2014) 
algorithm, 10 and 5 percent margins of victory (equation 3) and in a cubic spline polynomial 
(equation 4). For all our regressions, include state and term intercepts and robust standard errors 
are clustered at the municipality level are presented in brackets.  
Table 4 presents the effect of political alignment of mayors with president´s coalition on 
discretionary federal transfers mainly designated to infrastructure. Federal transfers are in 2000 
Brazilian reais. As was previously shown by Brollo & Nannicini (2012),  who analize a longer 
period, the effect of  alignment on federal transfers is  positive and  significant for the  all the  
specifications considered for all only for the last two years of the mandate.  According to Brollo 
& Nannicini (2012) interpretation,  the objective of  this  behaviour is to  penalize mayors no 
aligned, “tying their hands for the next election”. The difference, with respect to average level, 
is between 21% and 46%. 
In what follows, I present the effect of political alignment with PT president on different 
policies.  Despite receiving more federal transfers, there is no effect of alignment with 
president’s coalition on corruption measured at the municipality level. The  measures of 
corruption used are taken form Brollo et al. (2013) database and take into account the 
information disclosed in independent audit reports. Four measures of corruption are used: broad 
corruption (equal to 1 if at least one episode of broad corruption was found), narrow corruption 
(equal to 1 if at least one episode of narrow corruption was found) and the fraction of funds 
involved in corruption acts for both definitions (with is information is available). I do not a find 
an effect for any of these four indicators and in any of the RDD specifications estimated.   
  
 Table 4.  The effect of political alignment on Federal transfers 
Panel A: Transfers in the last two of mandate 
     Last two-year transfers 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition 5.26969 7.43008 9.95158 11.96166 16.33872 
 
(1.997)*** (3.712)** (3.870)** (4.598)*** (6.280)*** 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,468 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.159 0.166 0.178 0.194 0.232 
      Panel B: Transfers in the first two of mandate 
     First two-year transfers 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition 0.46077 1.777 4.12607 4.07635 5.67842 
 
-1.572 -2.932 -3.057 -3.286 -4.523 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,303 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.105 0.121 0.139 0.152 0.156 
Notes: Sample is restricted to races with two candidates. Regressions include state and term intercepts. 
This table reports the effect of mayor alignment with PT president´s coalition on federal transfers. 
Column 1 presents OLS estimation. Column 2 presents cubic spline polynomial approximations in 
equation (4).   Column 3 presents RDD as in equation 3 with optimal margin of victory, 15 percent in 
panel A and 13 percent in panel B. Column 4 and 5 presents RDD as in equation 3 with 10 and 5 percent 
margin of victory. Last two-year transfers are the average federal transfers in the last two years of 
mandate. First two-year transfers are the average federal transfers in the first two years of mandate. Both 
dependent variables are in per capita real values in 2000 Brazilian reais. Robust standard errors, clustered 
at the municipality, level in brackets. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
As was mentioned in the previous section, there are more first term mayors aligned with the 
president´s coalition. Previous work (Ferraz & Finan, 2011) find that mayors that cannot re run 
for re-election have more incentives to misappropriate resources, so the fact the unbalance 
sample of mayors used in results of Table 5 could influence the relationship between alignment 
and corruption. Table 6 presents results of the effect of alignment with president´s coalition only 
for mayors who are in their first term. Results remains unchanged.  
 
 Table 5. The effect of political alignment on corruption 
Panel A: Corruption (broad) 
           Corruption indicator (broad) Share of audited resources (broad) 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition -0.01951 0.07205 0.08196 0.04003 0.13324 -0.00546 0.00065 -0.00026 0.01066 0.03696 
 
(0.037) (0.096) (0.088) (0.119) (0.201) (0.010) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.030) 
Observations 474 474 333 202 113 441 441 264 187 104 
R-squared 0.088 0.095 0.119 0.141 0.192 0.075 0.077 0.121 0.148 0.336 
Panel A: Corruption (narrow) 
           Corruption indicator (narrow) Share of audited resources (narrow) 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition 0.02957 0.07538 0.06499 0.03580 0.08476 -0.00347 -0.00460 0.00616 0.00829 -0.00184 
 
(0.046) (0.107) (0.106) (0.139) (0.224) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 474 474 305 202 113 441 441 226 187 104 
R-squared 0.124 0.132 0.140 0.154 0.207 0.072 0.085 0.139 0.135 0.320 
Notes: Sample is restricted to races with two candidates. Regressions include state and term intercepts. This table reports the effect of mayor alignment with PT president´s 
coalition on corruption. Column 1 and 6 present OLS estimation. Column 2 and 7 presents cubic spline polynomial approximations in equation (4).   Column 3 and 8 presents 
RDD as in equation 3 with optimal margin of victory, 20 percent in the left part of panel A, 15 percent in the right part of panel A, 18 percent in the left part of panel B and 12 
percent in the right part of panel B. Column 4, 5 and 9,10 presents RDD as in equation 3 with 10 and 5 percent margin of victory, respectively. Corruption indicator (broad) 
and Corruption indicator (narrow) are dummy variables. Share of audited resources (broad) and Share of audited resources (narrow) are the proportion of resources involved 
in corruption acts. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality, are in brackets. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6. The effect of political alignment on corruption (first term mayors) 
Panel A: Corruption (broad) 
           Corruption indicator (broad) Share of audited resources (broad) 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s 
coalition 0.05008 0.11468 0.05416 0.09650 0.09826 0.00951 -0.01309 -0.01258 -0.01776 0.04095 
 
(0.051) (0.130) (0.125) (0.154) (0.243) (0.009) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.055) 
Observations 291 291 183 138 73 264 264 152 124 64 
R-squared 0.111 0.126 0.140 0.159 0.282 0.122 0.139 0.158 0.204 0.616 
Panel A: Corruption 
(narrow) 
           Corruption indicator (narrow) Share of audited resources (narrow) 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s 
coalition 0.07465 -0.02891 0.05046 0.06918 0.24860 -0.00096 -0.01043 -0.01072 0.00104 0.00056 
 
(0.060) (0.141) (0.144) (0.184) (0.369) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) 
Observations 291 291 191 138 73 264 264 192 124 64 
R-squared 0.146 0.162 0.155 0.218 0.249 0.149 0.158 0.169 0.238 0.506 
Notes: Sample is restricted to races with two candidates, for only those who are in their first term. Regressions include state and term intercepts. This table reports the effect of 
mayor alignment with PT president´s coalition on corruption. Column 1 and 6 present OLS estimation. Column 2 and 7 presents cubic spline polynomial approximations in 
equation (4).   Column 3 and 8 presents RDD as in equation 3 with optimal margin of victory, 20 percent in the left part of panel A, 15 percent in the right part of panel A, 17 
percent in the left part of panel B and 12 percent in the right part of panel B. Column 4, 5 and 9,10 presents RDD as in equation 3 with 10 and 5 percent margin of victory, 
respectively. Corruption indicator (broad) and Corruption indicator (narrow) are dummy variables. Share of audited resources (broad) and Share of audited resources (narrow) 
are the proportion of resources involved in corruption acts. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality, are in brackets. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 
Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
 Remain tables reports the effect of political alignment on several policies. Table 7 reports the 
effect of alignment with PT president´s coalition on public employment in municipalities. The 
information of public employment in municipalities is only available for the years 2005, 2006 
and 2007. Therefore, results are estimated for the municipalities of the sample restricted to two 
candidates, one aligned with the president´s coalition and the other no aligned only for the 
second term. Table 7 panel A show that there is only a positive and significant effect of political 
alignment on the total number of public employees in OLS regression. On the contrary, column 
2-5, show that the effect is not robust for any of the regression discontinuity specifications. 
Table 7 panel B presents the effect of political alignment on the fraction of temporary public 
employees. Temporary public employees in the last year of mandate is an indicator of political 
patronage, and could indicate how mayors are involved in strategic behaviours in order to 
improve their electoral chances (Brollo & Troiano, 2016). As in Panel A, the effect of alingment 
with PT presidnet´s coalition is not significant for any of the regression discontinuity 
specifications, and the effect is only significant in the OLS regression. 
  
 Table 7. The effect of political alignment on public employees  
Panel A: Public employees 
      Public employees 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition 31.55386 -31.83619 -2.06346 4.88099 37.48673 
 
(19.012)* (41.185) (41.194) (44.139) (58.017) 
Observations 1,480 1,480 856 730 391 
R-squared 0.248 0.251 0.325 0.344 0.297 
 
Panel B: Fraction of temporary public employees (last year of mayoral mandate) 
  
Fraction of temporary public employees (last year of mayor´s mandate) 
  
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s 
coalition 0.01517 0.00731 -0.00358 0.00443 0.02537 
 
(0.009)* (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.038) 
Observations 1,481 1,481 985 730 391 
R-squared 0.192 0.194 0.207 0.221 0.250 
Notes: Sample is restricted to races with two candidates. Regressions include state intercepts. This table 
reports the effect of mayor alignment with PT president´s coalition municipal on public employment 
(panel A) and the fraction of temporary public employees in the last year of the mayor´s mandate (panel 
B). Column 1 presents OLS estimation. Column 2 presents cubic spline polynomial approximations in 
equation (4).   Column 3 presents RDD as in equation 3 with optimal margin of victory, 22 percent for 
panel A and panel B. Column 4 and 5 presents RDD as in equation 3 with 10 and 5 percent margin of 
victory. Public employees variable is the average during 2005-2008 mandate, considering 2005,2006 and 
2008 years. Fraction of temporary public employees (last year of mayor´s mandate) is the share of 
temporary public employees in the last year of mandate. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
  
 Table 8 reports the effect of alignment with president´s coalition on different fiscal policies, all 
of them in per capita 2000 Brazilian reais. Table 8 Panel A, presents the results on municipal 
fiscal deficit, measured as the average of the total expenditures minus total revenues. The effect 
is positive but not significant for any of the RDD specifications. Table 8 panel B, presents the 
results on total expenditures. The effect is only significant at 10 percent level in the case of the 
optimal bandwidth estimation (17 percent in this case), but it vanished in the cubic spline 
estimation and when a margin of victory of 10 and 5 percent is used. Table 8 panel C, estimates 
the effect of alignment with president´s coalition on total revenues. In this case, the effect is 
again positive but not significant for any of the specifications considered.  
  
 Table 8. The effect of political alignment on fiscal policies 
Panel A: Fiscal deficit 
       Fiscal deficit 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition -5.60976 11.51375 2.06322 2.53849 -2.36558 
 
(5.863) (8.738) (5.969) (6.202) (6.874) 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,317 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.024 0.026 0.060 0.059 0.202 
Panel B: Expenditures 
       Expenditures 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition -12.93617 46.89999 60.50248 31.46416 25.74594 
 
(14.906) (29.994) (36.409)* (36.176) (51.566) 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,586 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.282 0.288 0.286 0.355 0.368 
Panel C: Revenues 
       Revenues 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition -8.25495 36.27252 44.05622 28.87957 27.11702 
 
(13.993) (29.637) (30.417) (37.142) (53.160) 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,645 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.333 0.339 0.358 0.382 0.383 
Notes: Sample is restricted to races with two candidates. Regressions include state and term intercepts. 
This table reports the effect of mayor alignment with PT president´s coalition municipal on fiscal deficit 
(panel A), total expenditures (panel B) and total revenues (panel C). Column 1 presents OLS estimation. 
Column 2 presents cubic spline polynomial approximations in equation (4).   Column 3 presents RDD as 
in equation 3 with optimal margin of victory, 13 percent for panel A, 17 percent for panel B and 19 
percent for panel C. Column 4 and 5 presents RDD as in equation 3 with 10 and 5 percent margin of 
victory. Dependent variables are the average during mandate and presented in per capita real values in 
2000 Brazilian reais. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality, are level in brackets. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
  
 In Table 9, I open revenues in its two main categories, current (panel A) and capital revenues 
(panel B). The latter, includes the federal transfers for infrastructure analysed in table 4. As it is 
show in panel A, the effect of PT coalition alignment on current revenues is not different from 0 
in all the specifications considered. On the contrary, the effect on capital revenues is positive 
and significant in the local regressions that considered the optimal bandwidth (19) and 10 and 5 
percent of margin of victory. This effect is mainly driven by extra resources on infrastructure 
that received municipalities ruled by mayors aligned with PT president´s coalition. 
Table 9. The effect of political alignment on types of revenues 
Panel A: Current revenues 
       Current revenues   
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition -11.25361 31.25070 35.13772 21.94070 18.64952 
 
(13.329) (28.638) (30.081) (35.922) (50.976) 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,627 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.328 0.333 0.349 0.372 0.371 
Panel B: Capital revenues 
       Capital revenues   
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory <10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition 2.66672 4.53298 6.79583 7.13149 9.30294 
 
(1.655) (3.031) (3.017)** (3.589)** (5.013)* 
ObservationsT 2,449 2,449 1,477 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.148 0.161 0.185 0.216 0.243 
Notes: Sample is restricted to races with two candidates. Regressions include state and term intercepts. 
This table reports the effect of mayor alignment with PT president´s coalition municipal on the two types 
of revenues: current revenues (panel A) and capital revenues (panel B). Column 1 presents OLS 
estimation. Column 2 presents cubic spline polynomial approximations in equation (4).   Column 3 
presents RDD as in equation 3 with optimal margin of victory, 19 percent for panel A and 19 percent for 
panel B. Column 4 and 5 presents RDD as in equation 3 with 10 and 5 percent margin of victory. 
Dependent variables are the average during mandate and presented in per capita real values in 2000 
Brazilian reais. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality, are level in brackets. *** Significant 
at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
  
 In table 10, I consider the effect of political alignment on two of the main types of expenditures 
in local governments in Brazil. Together, education and health account on average for 50 
percent of the total budget and local governments play a major role in the provision of these 
public services. The effect of political alignment on expenditures on health (per capita) is not 
significantly different from 0 in any of the specifications presented. The situation is different in 
educational expenditure. The effect is positive and significant at the 5 percent in the cubic spline 
regression and in the local regression with the optimal bandwidth (17 percent) at 10 percent. 
This effect on education represents 9 percent points of increment with respect to the average 
level. However, this effect vanished once that the local regression reduces the margin of victory 
and the number of observations 
Table 10. The effect of political alignment on health and education expenditure 
Panel A: Expenditures per capita on health 
     Health 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory 
<10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition -1.29186 6.12692 7.82787 2.86984 -1.09142 
 
(2.951) (6.235) (7.651) (7.659) (10.738) 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,528 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.300 0.302 0.304 0.349 0.362 
Panel A: Expenditures per capita on education 
     Education 
  
OLS 
Cubic 
Spline 
Margin of 
victory 
optimal 
Margin of 
victory 
<10 
Margin of 
victory <5 
President´s coalition -2.06071 17.40749 16.86247 12.51360 11.49092 
 
(3.636) (7.226)** (9.892)* (8.595) (12.327) 
Observations 2,449 2,449 1,517 1,080 575 
R-squared 0.182 0.189 0.191 0.258 0.273 
Notes: Sample is restricted to races with two candidates. Regressions include state and term intercepts. 
This table reports the effect of mayor alignment with PT president´s coalition municipal on health and 
education expenditures. Column 1 presents OLS estimation. Column 2 presents cubic spline polynomial 
approximations in equation (4).   Column 3 presents RDD as in equation 3 with optimal margin of 
victory, 16 percent for panel A and 17 percent for panel B. Column 4 and 5 presents RDD as in equation 
3 with 10 and 5 percent margin of victory. Dependent variables are the average during mandate and 
presented in per capita real values in 2000 Brazilian reais. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
municipality, are level in brackets. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
  
 To sum up this section that analyse the effect of political alignment with PT president centre left 
coalition, results show that i) mayors aligned with PT coalition receive more discretionary 
federal transfers in their last two years of mandate as it is was shown previously by Brollo & 
Nannicini, (2012) that analysed a longer period, that includes different president´s coalition, ii) 
although aligned mayors receive more federal transfers to infrastructure, being aligned do not 
increase the probability of being involved in corruption acts or an increment in the share of 
funds involved in corruptions acts, iii) aligned mayors neither increase local public employment 
and do not make use of political patronage, measured by the fraction of non-permanent public 
employees in the last year of mandate, iv) mayors of parties members of president´s coalition do 
not present differences in total expenditures and total revenues, v) there is evidence, although do 
not robust, that aligned mayor spend more in education, and do no spend more in health 
 
 5.4. Validity test 
There are some important validity tests that can be performed in a to analyse the validity of the 
RDD. The first check is the continuity of the margin of victory at the discontinuity point, to 
disregard the possibility of manipulation of percentage of votes.  If this is the case, and for 
example candidates aligned with the president could manipulate elections we would observe a 
concentration of observations in the right side of the threshold. This can be tested graphically, as 
it is shown in the frequencies of margin of victory Figure 2 for races of two candidates. 
Additionally, I test formally the discontinuity of the density function around the threshold using 
McCrary (2008) methodology. Results rejects discontinuity, and point estimate of the 
discontinuity (log difference in height) is -0.08 and standard error (0.087). Graphic of the 
density function it is shown in Figure 3. 
The second check is the continuity of the running variable (Margin of victory) around other 
covariates of interest. That means that the pre-election variables should be similar between 
municipalities where candidates aligned with the president´s coalition won and those where they 
lost. Figure 4-6 presents this graphs for the covariates used for the description of mayor and 
municipal characteristics. Visual information of these graphs coincides with what mentioned in 
4.2 section.  
 
  
 Figure 2. Frequencies of margin of victory.  
Two candidate’s races, competing aligned versus no aligned mayors. 
 
Notes: frequencies of margin of victory for races with two candidates, one aligned with president´s 
coalition and other no aligned for 2000 and 2004 elections. Margin of victory>0 when the candidate that 
won the election is aligned with president´s coalition and Margin of victory<0 when the election is won 
by the candidate no aligned. 
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 Figure 3. McCrary Test, two candidate’s races, competing aligned versus no aligned mayors. 
 
 
Notes: This graph presents the weighted kernel estimation of log density of the Margin of Victory for 
candidates aligned with PT president´s coalition, in two candidate’s races for 2000 and 2004 elections. 
Margin of victory>0 when the candidate that won the election is aligned with president´s coalition and 
Margin of victory<0 when the election is won by the candidate no aligned. Discontinuity estimate (log 
difference in height): -.079847933 and standard errors (.086781179). Bin size and bandwidth calculated 
according to McCrary (2008).  
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 Figure 4. Test of discontinuities in mayoral characteristics around the threshold.
 
Notes: Test of discontinuities in mayoral characteristics around the threshold. The blue line represents a 
split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of candidates aligned with president´s coalition (Margin 
of Victory>0) and no aligned (Margin of Victory<0). The green lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2% intervals. This sample is restricted to two 
candidate’s races in 2000 and 2004 elections. 
  
.8
.8
5
.9
.9
5
1
M
a
le
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Margin of vicotry
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
A
g
e
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Margin of vicotry
.6
.7
.8
.9
H
ig
h
 S
c
h
o
o
l 
c
o
m
p
le
te
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Margin of vicotry
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
F
ir
s
t 
te
rm
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Margin of vicotry
 Figure 5. Test of discontinuities in municipal characteristics around the threshold. 
 
Notes: Test of discontinuities in mayoral characteristics around the threshold. The blue line represents a 
split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of candidates aligned with president´s coalition (Margin 
of Victory>0) and no aligned (Margin of Victory<0). The green lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2% intervals. This sample is restricted to two 
candidate’s races in 2000 and 2004 elections. 
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 Figure 6. Test of discontinuities in macro regions around the threshold. 
 
Notes: Test of discontinuities in macro regions around the threshold. The blue line represents a split third-
order polynomial in Margin of Victory of candidates aligned with president´s coalition (Margin of 
Victory>0) and no aligned (Margin of Victory<0). The green lines represent the 95% confidence interval 
of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2% intervals. This sample is restricted to two 
candidate’s races in 2000 and 2004 elections. 
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 6. Conclusion 
Could be present in the context self-interested and more ideological motivations of politicians? 
How these two apparently opposite motivations can interact in a context of high incidence of 
corruption? These questions are important because the analyse of incentives of politicians has 
implications for the discussion about the role of the government and its welfare consequences.  
 In this dissertation, I try to address these questions analysing the effect of mayors aligned with 
a centre left coalition on Brazilian municipalities during two mayoral terms, from 2001 and 
2008. I focus the analysis on several policy outcomes, including corruption and specific public 
services, where local governments are important providers.  
Empirical evidence suggests that politician’s preferences also could be important also in context 
of high incidence of political agency problems. This result could also complement analyses the 
“political resource course” developed Brollo et al. (2013). However further research could be 
useful to understand up to what extent more resource could exacerbate rent extraction o could 
also increase the provision of important public services such as education. One possibility to 
extent this work is to analyse specific data of school facilities from educational census or 
changes in education outcomes of the population. This analysis is relevant for contexts of high 
inequality such as Brazil, where institutions are fragile but also the necessities of public services 
high.  
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 Appendix 
Table A1 
Party 
2001 2003 2005 2007 
& 2002 & 2004 & 2006 & 2008 
PMDB YES NO NO YES 
PT NO YES YES YES 
PSDB YES NO NO NO 
PFL YES NO NO NO 
PP YES NO NO NO 
PSB NO YES YES YES 
PDT NO YES YES YES 
PL NO YES YES YES 
PTB NO YES YES YES 
PPS NO YES YES YES 
PV NO YES YES YES 
PC do B NO YES YES YES 
PRONA* NO NO YES YES 
PSC NO NO NO NO 
PTC NO NO NO NO 
PSL NO NO NO NO 
PMN NO NO NO NO 
PHS NO NO NO NO 
PT do B NO NO NO NO 
PAN NO NO NO NO 
PRB NO NO NO NO 
PSDC NO NO NO NO 
PSL NO NO NO NO 
PSD NO NO NO NO 
PST NO NO NO NO 
Others NO NO NO NO 
Source (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012). *The political party PRONA merged with PL and PR after 2005. 
